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现金转移与儿童及青少年发展

Cash Transfers and Child and Adolescent Development

作者信息

Walque Damien de, Fernald Lia, Gertler Paul, Hidrobo Melissa

Abstract

Poverty has significant, detrimental, and long-ranging effects on child development (Walker and others 2011). Programs and policies around the world have attempted to address poverty to improve outcomes for children and adolescents, and one popular approach is to use cash transfer (CT) programs (Engle and others 2011). CT programs support vulnerable populations by distributing transfers to low-income households to prevent shocks; protect the chronically poor; promote capabilities and opportunities for vulnerable households; and transform systems of power that exclude certain marginalized groups, such as women or children (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). The economic rationale for CT programs is that they can be an equitable and efficient way to address market failures and reach the most vulnerable populations (Fiszbein and others 2009). When the provision of CTs is tied to mandatory behavioral requirements, they are conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, which operate by giving cash payments to families only if they comply with a set of requirements (the “conditions” of the cash transfer), usually related to health and education (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006). For example, many CCT programs distribute benefits conditional on the use of preventive health care services, attendance at health and nutrition education sessions designed to promote positive behavioral changes, or school attendance for school-age children (Barrientos and DeJong 2006; Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 2007). Definitions of age groupings and age-specific terminology used in this volume can be found in chapter 1 (Bundy and others 2017). Unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programs are those in which families receive cash benefits because the household falls below a certain income cutoff or lives within a geographically targeted region; however, no conditions are tied to the transfer (Barrientos and DeJong 2006). Given that UCTs do not monitor the behavior of households or require visits to health clinics, these programs are operationally less complex and easier for governments to implement because they do not require a well-functioning health care sector. Thus, administrative costs are often substantially lower for UCTs than for CCTs. School feeding is an example of a noncash transfer and is discussed in chapter 12 of this volume (Drake and others 2017). Both CCTs and UCTs assume that parents are income constrained, and thus do not have the money to spend to meet the most pressing needs of their families (for example, nutritious food, medical treatment). Providing greater purchasing power allows parents to choose what goods to buy and in what quantity and of what quality. The economic rationale for conditioning transfers on certain behaviors is that individuals or households do not always behave rationally because they have imperfect information, they behave myopically, or there are conflicts of interest between parents and children (Fiszbein and others 2009). In addition, conditioning transfers on human capital creates positive externalities and usually has more political support. However, many argue that conditioning transfers is paternalistic and costly to monitor and that the neediest households might find it too costly to comply (Grimes and Wängnerud 2010; Handa and Davis 2006; Popay and others 2008; Shibuya 2008). Mexico’s Prospera (previously Progresa and Oportunidades) and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia were among the first CCTs to be designed in the late 1990s and have been models for programs throughout Africa, Latin America, and the United States (Aber and Rawlings 2011; Fiszbein and others 2009). By 2011, CT programs covered an estimated 750 million to 1 billion people worldwide; India (48 million households), China (22 million households), Brazil (12 million households), and Mexico (5 million households) were among the countries with the largest programs (DFID 2011). In spite of the common features of many CTs, there is a large degree of heterogeneity across countries and programs with regard to program benefits, conditions, requirements, payments, and targets. For example, in Ecuador and Peru, the transfer is a fixed payment per family per month that does not vary by household size, whereas in Brazil, Malawi, and Mexico the benefits depend on the number, age, and gender of children in the household. In some programs (for example, Prospera in Mexico and Familias en Acción in Colombia), the payment is greater for secondary-school-age children than for primary-school-age children. Similarly, the average transfer amount varies greatly, ranging from 6 percent in Brazil to 22 percent to 29 percent in Mexico and Nicaragua to 200 percent of pretransfer consumption in Malawi (Fiszbein and others 2009; Miller, Tsoka, and Reichert 2010). The size of the transfer reflects the goal of the program, which can be to move households to a minimum level of consumption (Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico) or to base the size of the transfer on the opportunity cost of health care (Honduras) or on the transportation costs to the public health facility (Nepal) (Gaarder, Glassman, and Todd 2010). This chapter first reviews the evidence from CT programs, both conditional and unconditional, throughout low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), focusing specifically on the direct effects on child and adolescent health and education outcomes. It then discusses the design of CT programs and why and how they could theoretically affect outcomes for young children and adolescents. Although there are other types of social safety net programs, such as voucher schemes, food transfers, and user fee removals, we focus on CTs because many countries are switching to such programs given that they are easier to distribute. In addition, the evidence for many other types of programs is too sparse for them to be included in the analysis. CT programs are hypothesized to improve child and adolescent outcomes via the family investment model, according to which families have more money to spend on inputs (Guo and Harris 2000; Yeung, Linver, and Brooks-Gunn 2002) or more time to spend with children (Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall 2014), and the family stress model, according to which maternal depression and stress are lower because household resources are higher (Mistry and others 2004). CCT and UCT programs can vary widely in their objectives, design, and context. While many programs have the broad goals of reducing poverty and improving human capital, some are more focused on decreasing poverty, some on improving education outcomes, some on improving health outcomes, and some on improving nutrition outcomes. Program designs reflect these differences in objectives with differences in conditions, targeting, transfer size, beneficiaries, and complementary components. Consequently, although CCT and UCT programs have the potential to effect multiple outcomes by lessening a household’s budget constraints, some programs and contexts may be better suited to improving child and adolescent health and education outcomes. For example, programs in a handful of countries are beginning to experiment with the integration of parenting support or nutritional support—a direct intervention to promote child development—within CT programs (for example, in Colombia, see Attanasio and others 2014; in Mexico, see Fernald and others 2016). The literature review proceeded as follows. We began by examining the conclusions in the 2011 series on early child development in LMICs (Engle and others 2011; Walker and others 2011) and in five systematic reviews addressing CCTs published since 2011 (Bassani and others 2013; Fernald, Gertler, and Hidrobo 2012; Glassman, Duran, and Koblinsky 2013; Manley, Gitter, and Slavchevska 2013; Ruel, Alderman, and Maternal and Child Nutrition Study Group 2013). We then conducted a literature search to find papers that had been published since those systematic reviews. The search used Google Scholar, JSTOR, and PubMed for peer-reviewed articles and websites of the International Food Policy Research Institute, United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Bank for gray papers. The search was restricted to studies that used experimental or quasi-experimental techniques such as randomization, regression discontinuity, propensity score matching, or difference-in-differences. We found evidence from studies examining the effects of CTs on birth weight (3 studies); infant mortality (6 studies); height-for-age (or stunting) (23 studies); weight-for-age (or underweight) (12 studies); weight-for-height (or wasting) (10 studies); hemoglobin (or anemia) (10 studies); morbidity (16 studies); cognitive, language, and behavioral development (11 studies); and sexual and reproductive health (9 studies) (table 23.1).

摘要

贫困对儿童发展具有重大、有害且长期的影响(沃克等人,2011年)。世界各地的项目和政策都试图解决贫困问题,以改善儿童和青少年的发展成果,一种流行的方法是使用现金转移(CT)项目(恩格尔等人,2011年)。CT项目通过向低收入家庭发放转移资金来支持弱势群体,以预防冲击;保护长期贫困者;促进弱势群体家庭的能力和机会;并改变排斥某些边缘化群体(如妇女或儿童)的权力体系(德弗勒克斯和萨巴特 - 惠勒,2004年)。CT项目的经济原理是,它们可以成为解决市场失灵并惠及最弱势群体的公平且高效的方式(菲斯贝恩等人,2009年)。当现金转移的提供与强制性行为要求挂钩时,它们就是有条件现金转移(CCT)项目,其运作方式是只有当家庭符合一系列要求(现金转移的“条件”)时才向家庭支付现金,这些要求通常与健康和教育相关(德扬弗里和萨杜莱特,2006年)。例如,许多CCT项目根据预防性医疗服务的使用情况、参加旨在促进积极行为改变的健康和营养教育课程的情况,或学龄儿童的上学出勤率来发放福利(巴里恩托斯和德容,2006年;拉加德、海恩斯和帕尔默,2007年)。本卷中使用的年龄分组定义和特定年龄术语可在第1章中找到(邦迪等人,2017年)。无条件现金转移(UCT)项目是指家庭因收入低于某个特定门槛或居住在地理目标区域内而获得现金福利的项目;然而,转移资金没有附加条件(巴里恩托斯和德容,2006年)。鉴于UCT项目不监测家庭行为或不要求前往健康诊所,这些项目在操作上不太复杂,政府实施起来更容易,因为它们不需要一个运作良好的医疗保健部门。因此,UCT项目的行政成本通常比CCT项目低得多。学校供餐是非现金转移的一个例子,在本卷第12章中进行了讨论(德雷克等人,2017年)。CCT和UCT项目都假定父母受到收入限制,因此没有钱用于满足家庭最迫切的需求(例如,营养食品、医疗治疗)。提供更大的购买力使父母能够选择购买什么商品、购买数量和质量。将转移资金与某些行为挂钩的经济原理是,个人或家庭并不总是理性行事,因为他们信息不完美、行为短视,或者父母与子女之间存在利益冲突(菲斯贝恩等人,2009年)。此外,将转移资金与人力资本挂钩会产生正外部性,并且通常会获得更多政治支持。然而,许多人认为将转移资金与条件挂钩是家长式的,监测成本高昂,而且最贫困的家庭可能会觉得遵守成本过高(格里姆斯和万格纳鲁德,2010年;汉达和戴维斯,2006年;波佩等人,2008年;涩谷,2008年)。墨西哥的“进步繁荣计划”(以前的“进步计划”和“机会计划”)和巴西的“家庭补助金计划”是20世纪90年代末最早设计的CCT项目之一,并且一直是非洲、拉丁美洲和美国项目的典范(阿伯和罗林斯,2011年;菲斯贝恩等人,2009年)。到2011年,CT项目估计覆盖了全球7.5亿至10亿人;印度(4800万户家庭)、中国(2200万户家庭)、巴西(1200万户家庭)和墨西哥(500万户家庭)是实施此类项目规模最大的国家(英国国际发展部,2011年)。尽管许多CT项目有共同特征,但在项目福利、条件、要求、支付方式和目标方面,各国和各项目存在很大差异。例如,在厄瓜多尔和秘鲁,转移资金是每个家庭每月固定支付的金额,不随家庭规模变化,而在巴西、马拉维和墨西哥,福利取决于家庭中孩子的数量、年龄和性别。在一些项目中(例如墨西哥的“进步繁荣计划”和哥伦比亚的“行动中的家庭计划”),中学生的支付金额高于小学生。同样,平均转移金额差异很大,从巴西的6%到墨西哥和尼加拉瓜的22%至29%,再到马拉维转移前消费的200%(菲斯贝恩等人,2009年;米勒、措卡和赖歇特,2010年)。转移金额的大小反映了项目的目标,该目标可以是使家庭达到最低消费水平(哥伦比亚、牙买加、墨西哥),或者根据医疗保健的机会成本(洪都拉斯)或到公共卫生设施的交通成本(尼泊尔)来确定转移金额的大小(加尔德、格拉斯曼和托德,2010年)。本章首先回顾低收入和中等收入国家(LMICs)有条件和无条件CT项目的证据,特别关注对儿童和青少年健康与教育成果的直接影响。然后讨论CT项目的设计以及它们在理论上为何以及如何影响幼儿和青少年的发展成果。尽管还有其他类型的社会安全网项目,如代金券计划、食品转移和取消用户费用,但我们关注CT项目是因为鉴于它们更容易发放,许多国家正在转向此类项目。此外,许多其他类型项目的证据过于稀少,无法纳入分析。CT项目被假定通过家庭投资模型来改善儿童和青少年的发展成果,根据该模型,家庭有更多资金用于投入(郭和哈里斯,2000年;杨、林弗和布鲁克斯 - 冈恩,2002年)或有更多时间陪伴孩子(德尔博卡、弗林和威斯沃尔,2014年),以及家庭压力模型,根据该模型,由于家庭资源增加,母亲的抑郁和压力会降低(米斯特里等人,2004年)。CCT和UCT项目在目标、设计和背景方面可能有很大差异。虽然许多项目有减少贫困和改善人力资本的广泛目标,但有些更侧重于减少贫困,有些侧重于改善教育成果,有些侧重于改善健康成果,有些侧重于改善营养成果。项目设计通过条件、目标定位、转移规模、受益群体和补充组成部分的差异反映了这些目标差异。因此,尽管CCT和UCT项目有可能通过减轻家庭预算限制来实现多种成果,但某些项目和背景可能更适合改善儿童和青少年的健康与教育成果。例如,一些国家的项目开始尝试在CT项目中整合育儿支持或营养支持——一种促进儿童发展的直接干预措施(例如,在哥伦比亚,见阿塔纳西奥等人,2014年;在墨西哥,见费尔纳德等人,2016年)。文献综述如下进行。我们首先研究了2011年关于低收入和中等收入国家幼儿发展的系列研究结论(恩格尔等人,2011年;沃克等人,2011年)以及自2011年以来发表的五篇关于CCT的系统综述(巴萨尼等人,2013年;费尔纳德、格特勒和希德罗博,2012年;格拉斯曼、杜兰和科比林斯基,2013年;曼利、吉特和斯拉夫切夫斯卡,2013年;鲁尔、奥尔德曼和母婴营养研究小组,2013年)。然后我们进行了文献搜索,以找到自那些系统综述以来发表的论文。搜索使用谷歌学术、JSTOR和PubMed查找同行评审文章,并使用国际粮食政策研究所、联合国儿童基金会和世界银行的网站查找灰色文献。搜索仅限于使用实验或准实验技术(如随机化、回归断点、倾向得分匹配或差异中的差异)的研究。我们从研究中找到了关于CT对出生体重(3项研究)、婴儿死亡率(6项研究)、年龄别身高(或发育迟缓)(23项研究)、年龄别体重(或体重不足)(12项研究)、身高别体重(或消瘦)(10项研究)、血红蛋白(或贫血)(10项研究)、发病率(16项研究)、认知、语言和行为发展(11项研究)以及性与生殖健康(9项研究)影响的证据(表23.1)。

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