Devaux Christian A
Centre d'Etudes d'agents Pathogènes et Biotechnologies pour la Santé-CPBS, UMR5236 CNRS-UM1-UM2, 1919 route de Mende, F-34293 Montpellier cedex 5, Montpellier, France.
Infect Genet Evol. 2015 Jan;29:26-34. doi: 10.1016/j.meegid.2014.10.028. Epub 2014 Nov 7.
Highly pathogenic microorganisms and toxins are manipulated in academic laboratories for fundamental research purposes, diagnostics, drugs and vaccines development. Obviously, these infectious pathogens represent a potential risk for human and/or animal health and their accidental or intentional release (biosafety and biosecurity, respectively) is a major concern of governments. In the past decade, several incidents have occurred in laboratories and reported by media causing fear and raising a sense of suspicion against biologists. Some scientists have been ordered by US government to leave their laboratory for long periods of time following the occurrence of an incident involving infectious pathogens; in other cases laboratories have been shut down and universities have been forced to pay fines and incur a long-term ban on funding after gross negligence of biosafety/biosecurity procedures. Measures of criminal sanctions have also been taken to minimize the risk that such incidents can reoccur. As United States and many other countries, France has recently strengthened its legal measures for laboratories' protection. During the past two decades, France has adopted a series of specific restriction measures to better protect scientific discoveries with a potential economic/social impact and prevent their misuse by ill-intentioned people without affecting the progress of science through fundamental research. French legal regulations concerning scientific discoveries have progressively strengthened since 2001, until the publication in November 2011 of a decree concerning the "PPST" (for "Protection du Potentiel Scientifique et Technique de la nation", the protection of sensitive scientific data). Following the same logic of protection of sensitive scientific researches, regulations were also adopted in an order published in April 2012 concerning the biology and health field. The aim was to define the legal framework that precise the conditions for authorizing microorganisms and toxins experimentation in France; these regulations apply for any operation of production, manufacturing, transportation, import, export, possession, supply, transfer, acquisition and use of highly pathogenic microorganisms and toxins, referred to as "MOT" (for "MicroOrganismes et Toxines hautement pathogènes") by the French law. Finally, laboratories conducting researches on such infectious pathogens are henceforth classified restricted area or ZRR (for "Zone à Régime Restrictif"), according an order of July 2012. In terms of economic protection, biosafety and biosecurity, these regulations represent an undeniable progress as compared to the previous condition. However, the competitiveness of research laboratories handling MOTs is likely to suffer the side effects of these severe constraints. For example research teams working on MOTs can be drastically affected both by (i) the indirect costs generated by the security measure to be applied; (ii) the working time devoted to samples recording; (iii) the establishment of traceability and reporting to national security agency ANSM, (iv) the latency period required for staff members being officially authorized to conduct experiments on MOTs; (v) the consequent reduced attractiveness for recruiting new trainees whose work would be significantly hampered by theses administrative constraints; and (vi) the limitations in the exchange of material with external laboratories and collaborators. Importantly, there is a risk that French academic researchers gradually abandon research on MOTs in favor of other projects that are less subject to legal restrictions. This would reduce the acquisition of knowledge in the field of MOTs which, in the long term, could be highly detrimental to the country by increasing its vulnerability to natural epidemics due to pathogenic microorganisms that are classified as MOTs and, by reducing its preparedness against possible bioterrorist attacks that would use such microorganisms.
高致病性微生物和毒素在学术实验室中被用于基础研究目的、诊断、药物和疫苗开发。显然,这些传染性病原体对人类和/或动物健康构成潜在风险,其意外或故意释放(分别为生物安全和生物安保)是各国政府主要关注的问题。在过去十年中,实验室发生了几起事件并被媒体报道,引发了恐慌并增加了对生物学家的怀疑。在美国,一些科学家在涉及传染性病原体的事件发生后被政府命令长时间离开实验室;在其他情况下,实验室被关闭,大学在严重疏忽生物安全/生物安保程序后被迫支付罚款并长期被禁止获得资金。还采取了刑事制裁措施以尽量减少此类事件再次发生的风险。与美国和许多其他国家一样,法国最近加强了对实验室的法律保护措施。在过去二十年中,法国采取了一系列具体限制措施,以更好地保护具有潜在经济/社会影响的科学发现,并防止其被恶意之人滥用,同时又不影响通过基础研究取得的科学进展。自2001年以来,法国有关科学发现的法律法规逐步加强,直至2011年11月发布一项关于“PPST”(“保护国家科学技术潜力”,即保护敏感科学数据)的法令。遵循保护敏感科学研究的相同逻辑,2012年4月发布的一项命令中也针对生物和健康领域制定了相关规定。其目的是确定明确法国授权微生物和毒素实验条件的法律框架;这些规定适用于高致病性微生物和毒素的任何生产、制造、运输、进口、出口、持有、供应、转移、获取和使用操作,法国法律将其称为“MOT”(“高致病性微生物和毒素”)。最后,根据2012年7月的一项命令,从事此类传染性病原体研究的实验室从此被归类为限制区域或ZRR(“限制制度区域”)。在经济保护、生物安全和生物安保方面,与以前的情况相比,这些规定代表了不可否认的进步。然而,处理MOT的研究实验室的竞争力可能会受到这些严格限制的副作用影响。例如,从事MOT研究的团队可能会受到以下因素的严重影响:(i)应用安全措施产生的间接成本;(ii)用于样本记录的工作时间;(iii)建立可追溯性并向国家安全机构ANSM报告;(iv)工作人员正式被授权进行MOT实验所需的等待期;(v)因此对招募新学员的吸引力降低,他们的工作将受到这些行政限制的严重阻碍;以及(vi)与外部实验室和合作者进行材料交换的限制。重要的是,存在法国学术研究人员逐渐放弃对MOT的研究而转向其他受法律限制较少的项目的风险。这将减少在MOT领域的知识获取,从长远来看,可能会对该国造成极大损害,因为这会增加其因被归类为MOT的致病微生物而遭受自然流行病的脆弱性,并降低其应对可能使用此类微生物的生物恐怖袭击的准备能力。