DiEuliis Diane, Rao Venkat, Billings Emily A, Meyer Corey B, Berger Kavita
Diane DiEuliis, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. Venkat Rao, PhD, is Program Director, Health Market, Parsons Government Services, Washington, DC. Emily A. Billings, PhD, is Senior Analyst; Corey B. Meyer, PhD, is a Scientist; and Kavita Berger, PhD, is Principal Scientist; all at Gryphon Scientific, LLC, Takoma Park, MD.
Health Secur. 2019 Mar/Apr;17(2):83-99. doi: 10.1089/hs.2018.0082. Epub 2019 Apr 3.
Understanding the overall biosecurity and biodefense policy landscape, the relationships between policies and their effects on each other, and the mechanisms for leveraging advances in science and technology to enhance defensive capabilities is crucial for ensuring that policy strategies address long-standing gaps and challenges. To date, policy analyses have been conducted primarily on single issues, which limits analyses of broader effects of policies, particularly after implementation. Here we describe the first-ever systems-based analysis of the US biosecurity and biodefense policy landscape to analyze functional relationships between policies, including examination of the unintended positive or negative consequences of policy actions. This analysis revealed a striking bifurcation of the US policy landscape for countering biological threats, with one grouping of policies focused on prevention of theft, diversion, or deliberate malicious use of biological sciences knowledge, skills, materials, and technologies (ie, biosecurity) and a second grouping on development of capabilities and knowledge to assess, detect, monitor, respond to, and attribute biological threats (ie, biodefense). An analysis of indirect effects demonstrated that policies within groups may result in mutual benefit, but policies in different groups may counteract each other, limiting achievement of the policy objectives in either group. The current policy landscape predominantly focuses on pathogens and toxins, having limited focus on rapidly changing biotechnologies with potential to positively contribute to biodefense capabilities or introduce unknown and/or unacceptable security risk. Based on our analyses, we present actions for implementing biosecurity and biodefense policy in the United States that intends to harness the benefits of science and technology while also minimizing potential risks. This article synthesizes and highlights the major findings and conclusions from the detailed analyses, which can be found in the full report ( http://www.gryphonscientific.com/biosecurity-policy/ ).
了解整体生物安全和生物防御政策格局、政策之间的关系及其相互影响,以及利用科学技术进步增强防御能力的机制,对于确保政策战略解决长期存在的差距和挑战至关重要。迄今为止,政策分析主要针对单一问题进行,这限制了对政策更广泛影响的分析,尤其是在政策实施之后。在此,我们描述了有史以来首次基于系统的美国生物安全和生物防御政策格局分析,以分析政策之间的功能关系,包括审视政策行动意外产生的正面或负面后果。该分析揭示了美国应对生物威胁政策格局的一个显著分歧,一组政策侧重于防止生物科学知识、技能、材料和技术被盗、被挪用或被蓄意恶意使用(即生物安全),另一组政策则侧重于发展评估、检测、监测、应对生物威胁并确定其来源的能力和知识(即生物防御)。对间接影响的分析表明,组内政策可能会带来互利,但不同组的政策可能会相互抵消,从而限制两组中任何一组政策目标的实现。当前的政策格局主要关注病原体和毒素,对快速变化的生物技术关注有限,而这些生物技术有可能对生物防御能力做出积极贡献,或者带来未知和/或不可接受的安全风险。基于我们的分析,我们提出了在美国实施生物安全和生物防御政策的行动建议,旨在利用科学技术的益处,同时尽量减少潜在风险。本文综合并突出了详细分析中的主要发现和结论,完整报告可在(http://www.gryphonscientific.com/biosecurity-policy/ )查看。