Derecho Publico, UPV/EHU, Bilbao, Spain.
Ikerbasque, Bilbao, Spain.
J Med Ethics. 2020 Oct;46(10):660-661. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2020-106814. Epub 2020 Sep 9.
In their recent article, Brown analyse several ethical aspects around immunity passports and put forward some recommendations for implementing them. Although they offer a comprehensive perspective, they overlook two essential aspects. First, while the authors consider the possibility that immunological passports may appear to discriminate against those who do not possess them, the opposite viewpoint of immune people is underdeveloped. We argue that if a person has been tested positive for and recovered from COVID-19, becoming immune to it, she cannot be considered a hazard to public health and, therefore, the curtailment of her fundamental rights (eg, the right to freedom of movement) is not legitimate. Second, they omit that vaccine distribution will create similar problems related to immunity-based licenses. Vaccine certificates will de facto generate a sort of immunity passport. In the next phases of the pandemic, different immunity statuses will be at stake, because the need to identify who can spread COVID-19 is unavoidable. If a person does not pose a threat to public health because she cannot spread the infection, then her right to freedom of movement should be respected, regardless of how she acquired that immunity.
在他们最近的文章中,Brown 分析了免疫护照的几个伦理方面,并提出了一些实施免疫护照的建议。尽管他们提供了一个全面的视角,但他们忽略了两个重要方面。首先,尽管作者认为免疫护照可能会对那些没有护照的人产生歧视,但免疫人群的观点却没有得到充分发展。我们认为,如果一个人已经检测出 COVID-19 呈阳性并已康复,对其产生了免疫力,那么她就不能被视为对公共健康的威胁,因此,限制她的基本权利(例如,行动自由的权利)是不合法的。其次,他们忽略了疫苗分配将带来与免疫相关的许可证类似的问题。疫苗证书实际上将产生一种免疫护照。在大流行的下一阶段,不同的免疫状态将受到影响,因为必须确定谁可以传播 COVID-19 是不可避免的。如果一个人因为不会传播感染而不会对公共健康构成威胁,那么无论她是如何获得这种免疫力的,都应该尊重她的行动自由权利。