Wang Shujie, Liu Qin
School of Economics, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430070, China.
School of Entrepreneurship, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430070, China.
Heliyon. 2023 Mar 15;9(3):e14553. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e14553. eCollection 2023 Mar.
Under the background of digital economy and energy crisis, based on the theory of digital empowerment and prospect theory, aiming at the problems of inefficient collaborative innovation mode, long principal-agent chain, imperfect collaborative innovation mechanism and insufficient digital collaborative innovation degree of the core technology of new energy vehicles, this study constructs a decentralized multi-agent collaborative tripartite evolutionary game model with the participation of government building platform, new energy enterprises and academic research institutions, analyzes the evolution law and key factors, and finally compares the examples of the United States, China and European countries. Results show that: (1) Government subsidies should meet the sum of the strategic income difference and the credibility income is greater than the subsidies to enterprises and research institutions; (2) The subsidy structure and innovation performance show an inverted U-shaped structure. The management mechanism of platform should be optimized; (3) Government should improve the threshold for innovators to enter the decentralized new energy vehicle core technology breakthrough platform, and the contract maintenance strength is conducive; (4) The innovation subject has a dynamic income cost distribution coefficient, and reasonable control of the income and cost sharing coefficient is important; (5) Digital empowerment can make the above four mechanisms achieve dynamic optimization iteration and achieve better equilibrium solutions. Finally, practical countermeasures for the government are put forward, which improves the theoretical research and practical exploration.
在数字经济与能源危机背景下,基于数字赋能理论与前景理论,针对新能源汽车核心技术协同创新模式效率低下、委托代理链条长、协同创新机制不完善以及数字协同创新程度不足等问题,本研究构建了一个由政府搭建平台、新能源企业和科研机构参与的去中心化多主体协同三方演化博弈模型,分析其演化规律与关键因素,最后对比美国、中国和欧洲国家的案例。结果表明:(1)政府补贴应满足战略收益差与信誉收益之和大于对企业和科研机构的补贴;(2)补贴结构与创新绩效呈倒U形结构,应优化平台管理机制;(3)政府应提高创新者进入去中心化新能源汽车核心技术突破平台的门槛,且合同维护力度有利;(4)创新主体具有动态收益成本分配系数,合理控制收益与成本分担系数很重要;(5)数字赋能可使上述四种机制实现动态优化迭代并获得更好的均衡解。最后提出了政府的实际对策,完善了理论研究与实践探索。